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WATER RIGHTS, THE PUBLIC TRUST




Our society uses water for a variety of productive purposes, includ-
ing domestic, agricultural, mining, manufacturing, and energy develop-
ment. Most of these uses require physical removal of water from
watercourses or ground water aquifers. Water can also serve useful pur-
poses, however, when it remains a lake or stream. Flowing water helps
to maintain water quality and furthers other uses such as recreation, aes-
thetic values, and ecological interestsl-referred to as "instream uses. "2
Large quantities of water must remain in place to safeguard in-
stream uses.3 At the same time, the increasing demands of consumptive
water users4 are significantly reducing streamflows and lake levels in
many parts of the country.5 Arguably, streamflows are threatened be-
cause the existing water allocation regime does not properly recognize
instream uses and often favors consumptive uses at their expenses.6 For
this reason, some legal commentators have suggested the public trust
* Alumni Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1966, I.D. 1968, University of Flor-
ida; LLM. 1973, Yale University.
1. U.S. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 271 (1973);
Note, Protecting Streamflows in California, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 697, 697-98 (1980); Comment, Environ-
mental Significance of Instream Flows, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1298, 1301 (1986).
2. Lamb & Meshorer, Comparing Instream Programs" A Report on Current Status 435, 436,
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SPECIALTY CONFERENCE ON ADVANCES IN IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE:
SURVIVING EXTERNAL PRESSURES (published by American Society of Civil Engineers 1983).
3. Tarlock, Recent Developments in the Recognition of Instream Uses in Western Water Law,
1975 UTAH L. REV. 871, 874.
4. Consumptive uses are those uses that remove water and fail to return all or part of it to the
watercourse from which the user took it. Comment, Preserving Instream Flows in Oregon's Rivers
and Streams, II ENVTL. L. 379, 379 n.4 (1981).
5. Davis, The Riparian Right of Streamflow Protection in the Eastern States, 36 ARK. L. REV.
47, 47 (1982); Note, National Audubon Society v. Superior Court: The Expanding Public Trust
Doctrine, 14 ENVTL. L. 617, 617 n.l (1984) [hereinafter cited as Note, Expanding]. Shifts in water
use patterns from seasonal to continuous uses also put a heavy burden on streamflows by allowing
less opportunity for recharge. See Note, Water Allocation in Utah-Protection of Instream Uses,
1975 UTAH L. REV. 687, 694 [hereinafter cited as Note, Water Allocation].
6. See Note, The Public Trust Doctrine and California Water Law: National Audubon Soci-
ety v. Department of Water and Power, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 653, 654 (1982); Tarlock, Appropriation
for Instream Flow Maintenance: A Progress Report on "New" Public Western Water Rights, 1978
UTAH L. REV. 211, 212.
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doctrine as a basis for protecting streamflows and instream uses.7
The public trust doctrine is a common law principle of constitu-
tional dimensions.' The doctrine protects the public's interest in certain
critical resources by treating the public's interest as a property right
which the state cannot wholly alienate.9 The public trust doctrine has
traditionally protected navigation, fishing, and commerce.' 0 In its origi-
nal form, the public trust concept limited the power of private individu-
als to acquire title to lands beneath tidal waters;11 however, courts have
applied the doctrine to the beds under navigable fresh waters 12 and have
extended it to other natural resources as well.13
So far, only North Dakota and California courts have applied the
trust concept to water rights to protect instream uses, 14 but other courts
will probably follow their lead. If this trend occurs, it will have a
profound effect on our present system of water rights. This article sug-
gests that invoking the public trust doctrine as a restriction on presently
exercised water rights will have a destabilizing effect and will discourage
investment in water-dependent activities. Instead, a variety of regulatory
programs can effectively protect instream uses.
7. See, e.g., Dunning, Significance of California's Public Trust Easement for California Water
Rights Law, 14 U.C.D.L. REV. 357, 397-98 (1980); Johnson, Public Trust Protection for Stream
Flows and Lake Level, 14 U.C.D.L. REV. 233, 265-68 (1980); Note, Water Allocation, supra note 5,
at 699.
8. The public trust doctrine appears to have a constitutional foundation because it restricts
the power of state legislatures. In Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), the leading
American decision on the public trust doctrine, however, the Court did not specifically mention any
provision of the federal or state constitution as the source for the doctrine. See Comment, The
Public Trust Doctrine in Maine's Submerged Lands: Public Rights, State Obligation and the Role of
the Courts, 37 ME. L. REV. 105, 125 (1985). One commentator has suggested that the ninth amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution might provide a constitutional basis for the public trust doctrine.
See Cohen, The Constitution, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Environment, 1970 UTAH L. REV.
388, 394. In addition, some states have now codified the public trust principle in their constitutions.
E.g., FLA. CONsT. art. 10, § 11; ILL. CONsT. art. XI, §§ 1-2; MICH. CONsT. art. 4, § 52; N.Y.
CONsT. art. XIV, § 4; PA. CONST. art. I, § 27; R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 17; VA. CONST. art. XI, § 1. See
also Howard, State Constitutions and the Environment, 58 VA. L. REV. 193, 201-02 (1972).
9. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention,
68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 484 (1970); Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine Expansion and Integration:
A Proposed Balancing Test, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 211, 211 (1983).
10. Walston, Public Trust Doctrine in the Water Rights Context: The Wrong Environmental
Remedy, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 63, 66 (1982); Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient
Prerogative Becomes the People's Environmental Right, 14 U.C.D.L. REV. 195, 195-96 (1980).
II. Note, Expanding, supra note 5, at 622-23; Note, supra note 6, at 657-58.
12. See, e.g., Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); State of California v. Supe-
rior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 210, 229, 625 P.2d 239, 249, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696, 708 (1971); Priewe v. Wiscon-
sin State Land & Improvement Co., 93 Wis. 423, 214 N.W. 820 (1927). Note, supra note 6, at 658-
59; Note, Protecting the Peoples's Water: The California Supreme Court Recognizes Two Remedies to
Safeguard the Public Trust Interests in Water, 59 WASH. L. REV. 357, 358 (1984).
13. See, e.g., Robbins v. Department of Pub. Works, 355 Mass. 328, 244 N.E.2d 577 (1969)
(wetlands); Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966)
(parklands).
14. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d
709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied sub nom. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v.
National Audubon Soc'y, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State
Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976).
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This article begins with an overview of the public trust doctrine.
Part III discusses conventional water rights doctrines and how they treat
instream uses and streamflows. Part IV examines the reasoning of recent
decisions which have applied the public trust principle to water rights.
Part V then discusses and evaluates state regulatory efforts in this area
which offer alternative methods for protecting instream users.
II. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
A. Origins of the Public Trust Doctrine
1. Roman Law and English Common Law Antecedents
Legal scholars have traced the public trust concept to the law of
ancient Rome.5 Under Roman law great navigable rivers and harbors
were res publicae, things belonging to the public; therefore, they, were
state property.' 6 The state only held title to these areas, however, as
trustee of the public rights of navigation and fishing. 7 On the other
hand, the sea and the seashore were res communes or "common to all." II
In a society that depended on commerce, these principles ensured that
private interests would not monopolize vital resources to the detriment of
the general population. 9 This principle had a significant influence on
how the modem public trust doctrine developed in this country and
elsewhere.2 °
The English common law also contributed to formulating the public
trust doctrine in America. English law vested ownership of tideland ar-
eas in the King.21 Unfortunately, the English monarchs allowed much of
this land to fall into private hands during the Middle Ages.2 2 Later, in
15. See, e.g., Abrams, Governmental Expansion of Recreational Water Use Opportunities, 59
OR. L. REV. 159, 162 (1980); Seldon, Wherever the Water Flows: Lyon Applies the Public Trust to
Non-Tidal Water, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 21, 26 (1983); Note, supra note 6, at 656-57; Comment, supra
note 9, at 214.
16. W. BUCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 183 (3d
ed. 1963); Note, Public Trust in Public Waterways, 7 URB. L. ANN. 219, 221 n.9 (1974).
17. R. LEE, ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW § 133, at III (3d ed. 1952); Note, State Citizen
Rights Respecting Greatwater Resources Allocation: From Rome to New Jersey, 25 RUTGERS L. REV.
571, 576 (1971).
18. INST. JUST. 2.1.1 (S. Scott ed. 1973). See also Butler, The Commons Concept: An Histori-
cal Concept with Modern Relevance, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 835, 849-50 (1982); Note, The Public
Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometimes Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762, 763 (1970).
19. Note, Expanding, supra note 5, at 622. Recent scholarship has revealed, however, that the
Roman legal system was actually far less protective of public fights than Roman jurists indicated. In
reality, the sea and the seashore were available to the general public only insofar as imperial grants
did not appropriate them for private use. Similarly, although nominally open to all, the government
often farmed out fishing rights for exploitation by monopolies. See Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum
and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, I SEA GRANT L.J. 13, 21-36 (1976).
20. The Roman law concept of public rights to certain natural resources, such as the sea and
the foreshore, had a significant influence on continental legal systems. See, e.g., LES SIETE PAR-
TIDAS, partida 3, title 28, law 3 (1348) (translated in F. HALL, THE LAWS OF MEXICO § 1465
(1885)). See also Comment, California Beach Access: The Mexican Law and the Public Trust, 2
ECOLOGY L.Q. 571, 604-05 (1972).
21. Stevens, supra note 10. at 197-98.
22. Maloney & Ausness, The Use and Legal Significance of the Mean High Water Line in
No. 2]
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the sixteenth century, the Crown attempted to regain possession of tide-
lands by means of the "prima facie" theory.23 Under this theory, tide-
lands were a distinct category of property that private parties could
acquire only by an express grant from the sovereign. Consequently,
landowners who could not prove such a grant might lose their tideland
property.24
Although English courts rejected the prima facie theory at first,25
Sir Matthew Hale later adopted it in his influential treatise, De Jure
Maris,26 and the English courts eventually accepted the theory.27  Lord
Hale distinguished between the proprietary interests of the sovereign and
the rights of the public in tidal waters. According to Lord Hale, the
King could freely alienate his proprietary or jus privatum interest in the
tidelands. 28  This private right was subject, however, to public rights of
navigation29 and fishing3" which Lord Hale classified as jus publicum.31
Coastal Boundary Mapping, 53 N.C.L. REV. 185, 198 (1974); Note, supra note 18, at 765. See also
S. MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING THERETO 1-168 (3d ed.
1888).
23. Thomas Digges, a lawyer, surveyor, and engineer, first proposed the "prima facie" theory
in a pamphlet entitled Proofs of the Queen's Interest in Lands Left by the Sea and the Salt Shores
Thereof. See Fraser, Title to the Soil Under Public Waters-A Question of Fact, 2 MINN. L. REV.
313, 317 (1918); MacGrady, Navigability Concept in Civil and Common Law: Historical Develop-
ment, Current Importance and Some Doctrines That Don't Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 511,
559-61 (1975). Digges's pamphlet is reprinted in S. MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE AND
THE LAW RELATING THERETO 185-211 (3d ed. 1888).
24. 1 H. FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 39a (1904); Comment,
supra note 8, at 119.
25. See Constable's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 218 (K.B. 1601); Anonymous, 73 Eng. Rep. 737 (K.B.
1573). The court apparently employed the prima facie theory in Attorney General v. Philpott, de-
cided in 1632, but not reported. Maloney & Ausness, supra note 22, at 200. Bulstrode v. Hall, 82
Eng. Rep. 1024 (K.B. 1662), was the first reported case to adopt Digges's theory. In that case the
court declared: "Et in cest case fuit soven foits affirme & nient deny que le soil de touts rivers cy
haut que la est fluxum & refluxum maris est in le Roy & nemy in les siegneurs des mannors &c. sans
prescription." (It was frequently affirmed and never denied that the soil to all rivers as high as the
tide ebbs and flows is in the King and never in the lords of the manors without grant or prescrip-
tion.) Id.
26. M. HALE, A TREATISE RELATIVE TO THE MARITIME LAW OF ENGLAND IN THREE
PARTS. Hale apparently wrote his treatise around 1666, but it was not published until 1787 when it
appeared in volume I of Hargrove's A Collection of Tracts Relative to the Law of England. It was
later reprinted in S. MOORE, supra note 23, at 370. Page references to Hale's work are taken from
the Moore treatise. A substantial portion of Hale's treatise was also reprinted at the end of Ex parte
Jennings, 6 Cow. 518, 536-51 (N.Y. 1826).
27. See, e.g., Earl of Salisbury v. Joyn, 84 Eng. Rep. 992 (K.B. 1676); Whitaker v. Wife, 84
Eng. Rep. 479 (K.B. 1670); Kirby v. Gibs, 84 Eng. Rep. 183 (K.B. 1666). Until the mid-nineteenth
century, however, littoral owners uniformly could maintain their rights to the foreshore by express
grant or by prescription. Deveney, supra note 19, at 42-43.
28. Note, Conveyances of Sovereign Lands Under the Public Trust Doctrine: When Are They in
the Public Interest?, 24 FLA. U.L. REV. 285, 288 (1972).
29. Lord Hale declared that navigable waterways were "in the nature of common highwayes,
in which all the Kinges people have a liberty of passage." S. MOORE, supra note 23, at 339.
30. The public right of fishing was less extensive than that of navigation. The public had no
rights at all in nontidal waters. Tilbury v. Silva, 45 Ch. D. 98 (1890); Ewing v. Colquhoun, 2 App.
Cas. 839 (1877); J. GOULD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERS § 49, at 111-12 (3d ed. 1900).
According to Lord Hale, however, the public had a right to fish in tidal waters. S. MOORE, supra
note 23, at 339, 376-77. Although the King could grant an exclusive right to fish, the person who
asserted such a claim had the burden of proof. Lord Fitzwalter's Case, 86 Eng. Rep. 766, 766-67
[Vol. 1986
PROTECTION OF INSTREAM USES
Consequently, no conveyance by the sovereign of his private interest
could impair the jus publicum.32
Lord Hale made no mention of a public trust principle in his writ-
ings, and he acknowledged that the sovereign was free to alienate hisjus
privatum interest in tidal areas.3" Although Parliament eventually
placed restrictions on the King's power to convey Crown property, in-
cluding land under tidal waters,34 the concept that the King held these
lands for the benefit of the public was never fully accepted in England.35
Rather, the public trust doctrine is largely an American creation.
2. The Public Trust Doctrine in America
In the United States James Kent and others mistakenly believed that
under English law the public had a proprietary interest in the tidelands
and that the King merely acted as a trustee on the public's behalf. Be-
cause the states succeeded to the Crown's interests after the Revolution,
these commentators argued that state governments, like the King, held
these lands in trust for the benefit of the public. 36 Decided by a New
Jersey court in 1821, Arnold v. Mundy37 was the first American case to
suggest the concept of a public trust over tideland areas.38 The Arnold
case was followed in 1842 by the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Martin v. Waddell.39 Martin, like Arnold, involved a dispute over an
oyster bed in Raritan Bay.' The plaintiff claimed an exclusive right of
fishery from the Duke of York, who had received it from the King. The
defendant based his title on a grant from the New Jersey legislature. The
Court held the plaintiff's predecessors in title had surrendered their char-
ter to Queen Anne in 1702; therefore, it did not have to decide whether
the King had the power to convey proprietary rights in the Bay.4 Nev-
(K.B. 1672). Eventually, in the nineteenth century, the English courts determined that the Magna
Carta prohibited future grants of exclusive fishing rights in tidal waters. Gann v. Free Fishers, 11
Eng. Rep. 1305, 1312 (H.L. 1865); Duke of Somerset v. Fogwell, 108 Eng. Rep. 325, 328 (K.B.
1826); Blundell v. Caterall, 106 Eng. Rep. 1190 (K.B. 1821); Mayor of Carlisle v. Graham, L.R. 4
Ex. 361 (1869).
31. Fraser, supra note 23, at 433; Maloney & Ausness, supra note 22, at 190.
32. Howard, supra note 8, at 220; Comment, California's Tideland Trust: Shoring It Up, 22
HASTINGS L.J. 759, 761-62 (1971).
33. Comment, supra note 8, at 120.
34. 1 Anne ch. 7, § 5 (1701).
35. Deveney, supra note 19, at 50.
36. Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. R. 307, 315-16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805); J. ANGELL, A TREATISE
ON THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY IN TIDEWATERS 691-92 (7th ed. 1877); 3 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES
ON AMERICAN LAW 545-46 (9th ed. 1858). See also Dunning, supra note 7, at 363.
37. 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821).
38. Comment, supra note 8, at 121. The Arnold case involved a dispute over the right to take
oysters from the waters of Raritan Bay. Arnold claimed an exclusive right based on a seventeenth
century grant from the Duke of York. Mundy claimed a right on behalf of the public to take oysters
from the beds of navigable waters. The court ruled in favor of Mundy, holding that neither the King
nor his delegate, the Duke of York, had the power to alienate the bed itself. 6 N.J.L. at 76-78.
39. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
40. See supra note 38, at 121-22.
41. 41 U.S. at 415-18.
No. 2]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
ertheless, the Court declared that "the shores, and rivers, and bays, and
arms of the sea, and the land under them [were held] as a public trust for
the benefit of the whole community, to be freely used by all for naviga-
tion and fishery, as well for shell-fish as floating fish. .... 42 A few
years later, the Court held that title to tidelands became vested in a new
state upon its admission to the Union.43 In a subsequent decision, the
Court concluded that the public trust doctrine was not limited to tidal
areas; the doctrine extended to lands under navigable fresh waters."
The fullest exposition of the public trust doctrine appeared in Illi-
nois Central Railroad v. Illinois,4" decided by the Court in 1892. The
Illinois legislature made a grant of submerged lands under Lake Michi-
gan to the Illinois Central Railroad in 1869. In 1873, however, the state
revoked the grant and brought suit to have it declared invalid. The
United States Supreme Court declared that the title under which Illinois
held the property in question was a "trust devolving upon the State for
the public . . . which can only be discharged by the management and
control of the property in which the public has an interest, [and] cannot
be relinquished by a transfer of the property."" The Court then deter-
mined that the grant in question abdicated the state's control over a sig-
nificant portion of Lake Michigan and was inconsistent with the state's
obligation as trustee:
[T]he abdication of the general control of the State over lands under
the navigable waters of an entire harbor or bay, or a sea or lake...
is not consistent with the exercise of that trust which requires the
government of the State to preserve such waters for the use of the
public .... "
The Court went on to conclude that the state's control over trust prop-
erty could never be lost. The state may, however, dispose of parcels in
order to promote the public interest in navigation-so long as there is no
detriment to remaining submerged lands and the waters above. Accord-
42. Id. at 413.
43. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). In a later case the Court determined that
before statehood the federal government held the beds of tidal waters in trust for the citizens of the
future state and could not alienate the lands so as to impair the trust. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1
(1893).
44. Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876); Comment, Water Law-Public Trust Doc-
trine, 24 NAT. RESOURCES J. 809, 812 (1984). In England, the King's ownership rights, the jus
privatum, only extended to the beds of waters that were subject to the ebb and flow of the tides.
Maloney & Ausness, supra note 22, at 207-08. Public rights to navigation extended, however, to
navigable fresh watercourses even when the beds were privately owned. Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai.
R. 307, 315 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805); S. MOORE, supra note 23, at 374-76. Most American jurisdictions
extended the definition of navigability to include all watercourses that were navigable in fact. Com-
ment, supra note 8, at 109. Even so, the American courts thought it was "necessary for the state to
retain title to lands under water in order to preserve public rights of fishing and navigation."
Deveney, supra note 19, at 54.
45. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
46. Id. at 453.
47. Id. at 452-53.
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ingly, the Court upheld the state's claim and decreed that the purported
conveyance to the railroad was beyond the legislature's power.
In the years since the Court decided Illinois Central, the American
courts have used the public trust doctrine for a number of purposes.48
For example, the courts have relied upon the doctrine to require express
legislative action before allowing public agencies or private individuals to
devote trust resources to nontrust uses.49 The public trust doctrine has
also been invoked to strike legislation that disposed of trust resources in a
manner that was contrary to the public interest.5° Finally, some courts
have utilized the public trust doctrine as a guideline to review the con-
duct of municipalities and administrative agencies.5"
Although the public trust doctrine prohibits state legislatures and
other governmental entities from completely surrendering control over
trust resources, it does not entirely prevent conveying some portions of
property to private parties. The states can still transfer trust property
into private ownership to promote navigation or other trust purposes.
52
Thus, courts have upheld grants of submerged lands which allow private
persons to construct improvements such as wharves.5" Courts have also
allowed other conveyances which do not interfere with public rights.54
Moreover, there is not fixed priority among various trust uses.55 The
state may impair, therefore, certain trust interests-such as navigation-
in order to further other trust purposes-such as commerce.
56
48. Johnson, supra note 7, at 242-44. In addition, Professor Johnson has classified certain
other decisions, in which the court does not expressly mention the doctrine, as "functional" public
trust cases. These decisions include protecting stream and lake levels under the law of riparian
rights, navigation servitude cases, and cases which protect public access to lakes and streams for
recreation purposes. Id. at 244-52.
49. City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980); Robbins v. Department of Pub. Works, 355 Mass. 328, 244 N.E.2d 577
(1969); Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
50. See, e.g., Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land & Improvement Co., 93 Wis. 534, 67 N.W. 918
(1896). See also Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892), in which the Court used
the public trust doctrine to uphold state legislation that rescinded a prior legislative conveyance of
trust property.
51. See, e.g., Capano v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 530 F. Supp. 1254 (D.N.J. 1982); Robbins v.
Department of Pub. Works, 355 Mass. 328, 244 N.E.2d 577 (1969); Sacco v. Department of Pub.
Works, 352 Mass. 670, 227 N.E.2d 478 (1967); Lusadi v. Curtis Paint Prop. Owners Ass'n, 86 N.J.
217, 430 A.2d 881 (1981).
52. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892). See also Opinion of the Justices,
Me., 437 A.2d 597 (1981); Comment, supra note 8, at 124.
53. Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine and Western Water Law: Discord or Harmony?, 30
ROCKY MT. M.L. INST. 17-1, 17-12 (1984).
54. See, e.g., Martin v. Smith, 184 Cal. App. 2d 571, 7 Cal. Rptr. 725 (1960) (commercial
purposes); Kootenai Envt. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 105 Idaho 622, 671 P.2d
1085 (1983) (marina); Morse v. Oregon Div. of State Lands, 285 Or. 197, 590 P.2d 709 (1979)
(airport runway). But see Scott v, Chicago Park Dist., 66 Ill. 2d 65, 360 N.E.2d 773, 4 Ill. Dec. 660
(1976) (construction of steel plant).
55. Stevens, supra note 10, at 223.
56. See, e.g., Colberg, Inc. v. California ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P.2d
3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967) (construction of bridge across navigable watercourse); Boone v. Kings-
bury, 206 Cal. 148, 273 P. 797 (1928) (oil and gas exploration). See also Walston, supra note 10, at
70. In such cases, however, the government may have to make an effort to minimize the harm to
No. 2]
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Just as the public trust doctrine prohibits the state from completely
surrendering its control over trust property, so the grantee's use of trust
property may not interfere with navigation or other public rights. In
some states such as California, the courts have characterized this restric-
tion as an easement or servitude." Although the California courts pro-
tect existing improvements, the state has asserted the public trust
servitude to prevent filling or other development along tideland and lake-
shore areas.58
B. The Present Scope of the Public Trust Doctrine
The traditional role of the public trust doctrine has been to restrain
governmental activities that impair public rights in tidelands59 and navi-
gable waters." As a number of commentators have observed, however,
the public trust doctrine is a dynamic concept that courts can adapt to
meet new public needs.6" Not surprisingly, some courts have extended
the public trust doctrine beyond its traditional limits.
One example of this phenomenon is the application of public trust
principles to governmental activities that adversely affect wetland, dry
beaches, parklands, or other publicly owned resources. Thus, in Gould v.
62Greylock Reservation Commission, a Massachusetts court invoked the
public trust doctrine to invalidate a lease and management agreement
involving a public park. Under the terms of the agreement, the state had
consented to lease 4,000 acres of the 8,800 acre park to a consortium of
private investors for constructing and operating a commercial ski resort.
Another case, Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 63 involved a munici-
pal user access fee schedule which discriminated against nonresidents. In
Neptune City, the New Jersey Court did not limit the public trust doc-
trust property or interests. City of Madison v. State, I Wis. 2d 252, 83 N.W.2d 674 (1957); State v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 275 Wis. 112, 81 N.W.2d 71 (1957); City of Milwaukee v. State, 193 Wis. 423,
214 N.W. 820 (1927). See also Payne v. Kassab, 11 Pa. Commw. 14, 312 A.2d 86 (1973), aff'd, 468
Pa. 226, 361 A.2d 263 (1976).
57. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 796
(1971); People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 593, 138 P. 79, 85 (1913); Oakland v. Oakland
Water Front Co., 118 Cal. 160, 183, 50 P. 277, 285 (1897). See also Dunning, supra note 7, at 362-
68.
58. See, e.g., State of Cal. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 210, 226, 625 P.2d 239, 248, 172 Cal.
Rptr. 696, 705 (1981); City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 528, 606 P.2d 362, 369,
162 Cal. Rptr. 327, 334, cert. denied sub norm Santa Fe Improvement Co. v. City of Berkeley, 449
U.S. 840 (1980).
59. See, e.g., City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 369, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 327, cert denied sub no. Santa Fe Improvement Co. v. City of Berkeley, 449 U.S. 840 (1980);
People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 584, 138 P. 79, 88 (1913).
60. See, e.g., State of Cal. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 210, 231-32, 625 P.2d 239, 252, 172
Cal. Rptr. 696, 708-09, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 865 (1981); Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land & Im-
provement Co., 93 Wis. 534, 550-52, 67 N.W. 918, 922 (1896), aff'd on reh'g, 103 Wis. 537, 79 N.W.
780 (1899).
61. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 7, at 241; Sax, supra note 9, at 474; Walston, supra note 10,
at 66.
62. 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
63. 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972).
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trine to the foreshore, but applied it to the dry beach, at least when
owned by a municipality." Because the city held title to the beach as
trustee for all of the state's citizens, the court concluded that a discrimi-
natory fee schedule was contrary to the principles of the trust.6 5 In the
court's words, "at least where the upland sand area is owned by a munic-
ipality. . . and dedicated to public beach purposes. . . the public trust
doctrine dictates that the beach and the ocean waters must be open to all
on equal terms."66
The courts have also expanded the public trust doctrine to include
such interests as recreational uses and environmental protection. 67 For
example, in Neptune City, the court declared that public rights were not
limited to navigation, fishing, and commerce, "but extend as well to rec-
reational uses, including bathing, swimming and other shore activi-
ties."' 68 A California court in Marks v. Whitney,69 also took a broad view
of the interests protected by the public trust doctrine. Marks was an
action to quiet title to tideland. The trial court refused to find that the
tideland property was subject to the public trust;70 on appeal the Califor-
nia Supreme Court reversed, holding that the public trust extended to
privately owned tidelands. The court declared that public trust purposes
included the right to hunt, fish, bathe, swim, to use the water for boating
and general recreation purposes, and to use the bed for anchoring, stand-
ing, or other purposes.71 In addition, the court determined that preserv-
ing the tidelands in their natural state could be a public trust purpose. In
the court's words:
There is a growing public recognition that one of the most impor-
tant public uses of the tidelands-a use encompassed within the
tidelands trust-is preservation of these lands in their natural state,
so that they may serve as ecological units for scientific study, for
open space, and as environments which provide food and habitat for
birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and
climate of the area.72
64. Comment, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 554, 559-60 (1973).
65. Statute permitted user fees. Jaffee, The Public Trust Doctrine Is Alive and Kicking in New
Jersey Tidalwaters: Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea-A Case of Happy Atavism?, 14 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 309, 311 (1974). A lower court held that the practice of charging higher access fees to
nonresidents did not deny equal protection because the city's taxpayers paid additional boardwalk
maintenance and safety costs. 114 N.J. Super. 115, 123, 274 A.2d 860, 864-65 (L. Div. 1971).
66. 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (1972).
67. Note, Lyon and Fogerty: Unprecedented Extensions of the Public Trust, 70 CALIF. L. REV.
1138, 1149 (1982).
68. 61 N.J. 296, 309, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (1972).
69. 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
70. Marks had obtained title to a tract of submerged land that bordered on Whitney's water-
front lot. When Marks attempted to fill his submerged land, Whitney asserted a claim based on his
status as a littoral owner and as a beneficiary of the public trust in tideland areas. Comment, The
Tideland Trust: Economic Currents in a Traditional Legal Doctrine, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 826, 866
(1974).
71. 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 796 (1971).
72. Id.
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In light of these judicial expansions of the public trust doctrine's
scope, some legal scholars believe that the trust concept can protect in-
stream values as well. According to these commentators, if courts can
use the public trust doctrine to restrict fills and other activities which
adversely affect public rights in navigable waters, the doctrine should
also apply to water allocation laws.73 These laws determine who may
withdraw water and in what quantity they may withdraw it from
streams and lakes.
III. WATER ALLOCATION DOCTRINES
Two major allocation systems, riparianism and prior appropriation,
govern consumptive use rights in watercourses in America. States in the
eastern part of the country generally follow the riparian system; prior
appropriation prevails in the West.
A. Riparian Rights
Under the riparian theory, water rights arise from ownership of land
that borders on a natural watercourse such as a lake or stream.74 Ripa-
rian jurisdictions use either the natural flow doctrine or the reasonable
use rule to resolve conflicts among competing water users.
Under the natural flow doctrine each riparian proprietor on a water-
course is entitled to have the stream flow through the land in its natural
condition, without other users perceptibly retarding, diminishing, or pol-
luting the flow.7" Although the natural flow doctrine does not entirely
prohibit consumptive uses, it does distinguish between "natural" and
"artificial" uses.76 The riparian owner may use as much water as neces-
sary for such natural uses as bathing, drinking, and household purposes,
even though this depletes the entire streamflow.77 The natural flow doc-
trine treats artificial uses, which are not essential to life, but which
merely increase comfort and prosperity, more stringently. Artificial uses
include irrigation, manufacturing, power generation, mining, and large-
scale watering of livestock.7" Riparian landowners may divert water for
artificial uses only as long as such uses do not materially interfere with
the natural flow of the watercourse. A use which impairs the natural
73. Dunning, supra note 7, at 397-98; Johnson, supra note 7, at 257-58.
74. VI-A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 28.55 (J. Casner ed. 1954); Lugar, Water Law in
West Virginia, 66 W. VA. L. REV. 191, 194 (1964).
75. Hanks, The Law of Water in New Jersey, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 621, 628-29 (1968).
76. Evans v. Merriweather, 4 Il. 492 (1842); L. KINNEY, THE LAW OF IRRIGATION AND
WATER RIGHTS § 486 (2d ed. 1912).
77. Spence v. McDonough, 42 N.W. 371 (Iowa 1889); Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 93 N.W.
781 (Neb. 1903); Meng v. Coffey, 93 N.W. 713, 715-16 (Neb. 1903); Hough v. Porter, 98 P. 1083
(Or. 1902); Filbert v. Dechert, 22 Pa. Super. 362 (1903); Beuscher, Appropriation Water Law Ele-
ments in Riparian Doctrine States, 10 BUFFALO L. REV. 448, 452 (1961).
78. Prentice v. Geiger, 74 N.Y. 341 (1878); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Miller, 3 A. 780 (Pa. 1886);
Lone Tree Ditch Co. v. Cyclone Ditch Co., 128 N.W. 596 (S.D. 1910); Watkins Land Co. v. Cle-
ments, 86 S.W. 733 (Tex. 1905); Nielson v. Sponer, 89 P. 155 (Wash. 1907).
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condition of the stream will create a cause of action on behalf of down-
stream owners, however, even though they are not presently withdrawing
water from the stream.79
This formulation of riparian rights may substantially protect in-
stream uses. In fact, courts have applied the natural flow theory in some
cases to protect littoral owners against excessive lowering of lake levels
by dam operators."0 Downstream mill owners have also invoked the the-
ory to prevent upstream water users from reducing the flow.8 ' Accord-
ing to a recent study, however, no reported cases exist in which courts
have relied upon the natural flow doctrine to protect recreational or envi-
ronmental interests in a stream.1
2
Most riparian jurisdictions now adhere to the reasonable use rule,
although natural flow language occasionally pervades even recent deci-
sions.8 3 Under the reasonable use rule, each riparian landowner may use
water for any beneficial purpose as long as the use is reasonable consider-
ing the needs of other riparian proprietors and does not unduly interfere
with their legitimate water uses.8 4 Water rights under the reasonable use
rule are not permanent or fixed in terms of a specific amount, however,
and may vary according to changing conditions. Thus, a use which is
reasonable under existing circumstances may become unreasonable when
other proprietors initiate new uses on a watercourse.8 "
Although relatively few decisions have involved recreational or simi-
lar instream uses, such uses apparently receive as much protection as
79. Harvey Realty Co. v. Wallingford, 150 A. 60 (Conn. 1930); Robertson v. Arnold, 186 S.E.
806 (Ga. 1936); Roberts v. Martin, 77 S.E. 535 (W. Va. 1913); Comment, Development of Riparian
Land in Alabama, 12 ALA. L. REV. 155, 158 (1959).
80. See, e.g., Bouris v. Largent, 94 Ill. App. 2d 251, 236 N.E.2d 15 (1968); Dardenne Realty
Co. v. Abeken, 232 Mo. App. 945, 106 S.W.2d 966 (1937).
81. See, e.g., Parker v. Griswold, 17 Conn. 288 (1845); White v. East Lake Land Co., 96 Ga.
415, 23 S.E. 393 (1895); Robertson v. Arnold, 182 Ga. 664, 186 S.E. 806 (1936); Chestatee Pyrites
Co. v. Cavenders Creek Gold Mining Co., 118 Ga. 255, 45 S.E. 267 (1903); Stock v. Jefferson Town-
ship, 114 Mich. 357, 72 N.W. 132 (1897); Samuels v. Armstrong, 46 Misc. 481, 93 N.Y.S. 24 (Sup.
Ct. 1905); Roberts v. Martin, 72 W. Va. 92, 77 S.E. 535 (1913).
82. See generally Davis, supra note 5.
83. Some courts apply the reasonable use rule between riparian owners but invoke the natural
flow doctrine when a riparian seeks to prevent a nonriparian from withdrawing water from a stream.
Compare Hazard Powder Co. v. Somersville Mfg. Co., 61 A. 519 (Conn. 1905) with Harvey Realty
Co. v. Wallingford, 150 A. 60 (Conn. 1930).
84. Ausness, Water Rights Legislation in the East: A Program for Reform, 24 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 547, 549 (1983).
85. Harnsberger, Prescriptive Water Rights in Wisconsin, 1961 Wis. L. REV. 47, 60; Lauer,
Reflections on Riparianism, 35 Mo. L. REV. 1, 10 (1970). The reasonable use rule now appears in
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. Section 850 provides that a riparian proprietor is subject
to liability for making an unreasonable use when its diversion or withdrawal causes harm to another
riparian owner's reasonable use of their water or land. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850
(1979). Reasonableness in this context involves a consideration of such factors as: (a) the purpose of
the use; (b) the suitability of the use of the watercourse; (c) the economic value of the use; (d) the
social value of the use; (e) the extent and amount of harm caused by the use; (f) the practicality of
avoiding the harm by adjusting the use or method of use of one proprietor or another; (g) the practi-
cality of adjusting the quantity of water used by each proprietor; (h) the protection of existing values
of water uses; and (i) the justice of requiring the user causing harm to bear the loss. Id. at § 850A.
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traditional consumptive uses of water.8 6 For example, in Collens v. New
Canaan Water Company 87 a water company's pumping operations dried
up a river and prevented the plaintiff from boating and fishing near his
riparian land. The court enjoined the pumping, holding that the defend-
ant had no right to divert the flow of the river to the injury of other
88riparian owners.
Littoral owners have successfully sued to prevent irrigators from in-
terfering with recreational uses by lowering lake levels. For example, in
Harris v. Brooks,89 a farmer who pumped water from a small lake to
irrigate his rice fields lowered the lake level and harmed the plaintiff's
fish camp. The court found the defendant's use to be unreasonable and
prohibited him from withdrawing water whenever recreational fishing
was significantly impaired.90 A Florida court reached a similar result in
Taylor v. Tampa Coal Co. 91 In that case, the plaintiff, who used the lake
for recreational purposes, sought an injunction to prevent the defendant
from pumping water during the dry season to irrigate his citrus grove.
The court declared that recreational uses were entitled to the same pro-
tection as agricultural uses; therefore, the court affirmed a lower court
order which had enjoined the defendant from pumping during the dry
season when the lake level fell below a specified point.92
The riparian system of water rights offers some protection to in-
stream uses. Because the system only recognizes private property rights,
however, this protection is somewhat limited. Consequently, the riparian
system protects public recreational or environmental values only to the
extent that they coincide with the economic interests of riparian or litto-
ral owners. In addition, riparian owners must enforce their rights
through litigation. Because lawsuits are time-consuming, expensive, and
uncertain in terms of outcome, riparian owners are not always willing to
enforce their rights vigorously. 93
B. Prior Appropriation
The prior appropriation system provides that the water user who
first diverts water from a watercourse and puts it to a beneficial use ac-
quires a right that is superior to that of any subsequent water user.94
86. Davis, supra note 5, at 50.
87. 115 Conn. 477, 234 A.2d 825 (1967).
88. See also Scott v. Slaughter, 237 Ark. 394, 373 S.W.2d 577 (1963). In addition, courts have
applied the reasonable use rule when dams have reduced the flow available to downstream millown-
ers. In each case involving such dams, however, the courts found that the defendant's use was a
reasonable one. See, e.g., North Ala. Coal, Iron & Ry. v. Jones, 156 Ala. 360, 47 So. 144 (1908);
Davis v. Getchell, 50 Me. 602 (1862); Pitts v. Lancaster Mills, 54 Mass. 156 (1847); Hartzall v. Sill,
12 Pa. 248 (1849).
89. 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955).
90. Id. at 447, 283 S.W.2d at 135.
91. 46 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1950).
92. Id. at 394.
93. Ausness, supra note 84, at 553.
94. See Note, Expanding, supra note 5, at 627; Note, Arizona Water Law: The Problem of
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Appropriative rights are not restricted to riparian owners, nor does the
appropriator have to use the water on riparian land.95 In addition, ap-
propriative water rights are perpetual in duration, although the appropri-
ator may lose them through abandonment or nonuse.96 Appropriators
must claim and use a definite quantity of water,97 usually expressed in
terms of cubic feet per second in the case of direct diversions, or in terms
of acre-feet for reservoir storage.98 Under some circumstances, the ap-
propriator may change an existing use or transfer the water right to an-
other water user.99
A comprehensive statutory and administrative structure, which
modifies the prior appropriation system, now typically regulates water
users in the West. In most jurisdictions a state agency issues water per-
mits pursuant to some form of adjudicative process. The permit may
limit water withdrawals to specific times of the day or week and will
invariably require the applicant to designate the place where it will use
the water. " Moreover, the agency often has the power to modify permit
applications in order to protect senior appropriators or the public
interest. '
The doctrine of prior appropriation evolved during a period in
American history that favored extractive industries such as mining, lum-
bering, and agriculture. For this reason, the prior appropriation system
favors consumptive uses at the expense of instream uses.'12 The way in
which the courts and the administrative agencies responsible for water
allocation decisions have interpreted both the beneficial use and the ac-
tual diversion requirements reflects this orientation toward intake uses.
1. The Beneficial Use Requirement
A user cannot acquire a water right in the West unless it puts the
water to a beneficial use. The concept of beneficial use has both qualita-
tive and quantitative aspects. Qualitatively, a beneficial use is the use of
water for a purpose that the law recognizes and accepts. The qualitative
aspect of the beneficial use requirement limits the water that an appropri-
ator may take to an amount which is reasonable and appropriate for the
proposed use. 103
At one time courts and state legislatures regarded instream uses as
Instream Appropriation for Environmental Use by Private Appropriators, 21 ARIz. L. REV. 1095,
1098 (1979).
95. Davis, Australian and American Water Allocation Systems Compared, 9 B.C. INDUS. &
COM. L. REV. 647, 688 (1968).
96. Johnson, The Challenge of Prescriptive Water Rights, 30 TEX. L. REV. 669, 673 (1952).
97. 5 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 710[s] (1986).
98. 1 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 491 (1971).
99. Note, Water Allocation, supra note 5, at 688, 692.
100. 1 W. HUTCHINS, supra note 98, at 517.
101. Davis, supra note 95, at 688-89.
102. Note, supra note 94, at 1100.
103. Id. at 1104-05.
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inherently wasteful because water had to remain in place, leaving less
available for appropriators to use for out-of-stream consumptive pur-
poses. O' Recently, however, the courts have shown more appreciation
for the social utility of instream uses. For example, the New Mexico
court in State ex rel. State Game Commission v. Red River Valley Co. 105
held that recreation and fishing were beneficial uses. An Arizona inter-
mediate appellate court reached a Similar conclusion in Brasher v. Gib-
son."° In addition, a number of western states have statutorily declared
that using instream flows for fish, wildlife, and recreational purposes is a
beneficial use. 10
2. The Actual Diversion Requirement
The traditional rule was that a user physically had to divert water
from a watercourse in order to perfect an appropriation. 18 This require-
ment effectively prevented in-stream appropriations."° Physical diver-
sion provided objective proof of an intent to appropriate110 and provided
notice of the new water user's claim to other users on the stream."' The
physical diversion requirement was also supposed to prevent a single
water user from monopolizing the entire stream. 12 However, the advent
of modern permit systems has made the physical diversion requirement
obsolete. The act of filing a permit application with the appropriate state
agency both manifests an intent on the part of the applicant to appropri-
ate water and provides adequate notice to other water users in the
area." Similarly, state supervision of appropriation through the permit
system discourages excess claims more effectively than a physical diver-
sion requirement.114 Nevertheless, some western states still retain the ac-
tual diversion requirement.
The continuing impact of the actual diversion requirement on in-
stream uses is illustrated by Fullerton v. State Water Resources Control
104. Lake Shore Duck Club v. Lake View Duck Club, 50 Utah 76, 166 P. 309 (1917); Tarlock,
supra note 3, at 883; Note, Statutory Recognition of Instream Flow Preservation: A Proposed Solution
for Wyoming, 17 LAND & WATER L. REV. 139, 142 (1982).
105. 51 N.M. 207, 182 P.2d 421 (1945).
106. 2 Ariz. App. 91, 406 P.2d 441 (1965). See also Osnes Livestock Co. v. Warren, 103 Mont.
284, 62 P.2d 206 (1936).
107. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-141(A) (Supp. 1984-85); CAL. WATER CODE § 1243 (West
Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1974); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-102(2) (1983);
OR. REV. STAT. § 537.170(5)(a) (1985); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.024(7) (Vernon 1972); WASH.
REV. CODE § 90.54.020(1) (1986 Supp.); NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.030(2) (1985); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 61-04-06.1 (Supp. 1983).
108. See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co., 158
Colo. 331, 406 P.2d 798 (1965).
109. Tarlock, supra note 6, at 220; Note, supra note 104, at 140.
110. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Miranda, 493 P.2d 409, 411 (N.M. 1972).
111. Millheiser v. Long, 10 N.M. 99, 106-07, 61 P. 111, 113-14 (1900); Note, In-Stream Appro-
priation for Recreation and Scenic Beauty, 12 IDAHO L. REV. 263, 273 (1976).
112. Tarlock, supra note 6, at 225.
113. Note, supra note 104, at 141.
114. Tarlock, supra note 3, at 878.
[Vol. 1986
PROTECTION OF INSTREAM USES
Board.'I5 In that case, the California Department of Fish and Game
filed an application to appropriate 38,400 acre-feet of water per year in
the Mattole River in order to protect fish during low flow periods. The
Water Resources Control Board ruled that the applicant must acquire
physical control over the water. According to the Board, an actual di-
version was unnecessary because the Department could accomplish phys-
ical control by acquiring ownership of the banks of the river or by
constructing an impoundment upstream."
6
The Board's decision was upheld by the trial court and affirmed on
appeal. According to the appellate court, prior appropriation developed
from mining customs which required that "an appropriator must physi-
cally gain control of the water and that one way of doing so was by
separating it from the watercourse and conveying it to its place of
use.""' The court declared that the legislation which made the statutory
appropriation procedure the exclusive method of acquiring water rights
in California also embodied this principle." 8
IV. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AS A LIMIT ON THE EXERCISE
OF WATER RIGHTS
Only North Dakota and California now have applied the public
trust doctrine to protect flowing waters, as opposed to the submerged
lands beneath them. Although the North Dakota case, United
Plainsmen Association v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Com-
mission, " 9 is somewhat limited in scope, the California Supreme Court's
decision in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine
County 120 may have a significant impact on the law of water allocation in
the United States.
A. Applying the Public Trust to Water Rights
1. The United Plainsmen Decision
United Plainsmen was the first case to hold that water rights, like
submerged land, are subject to the public trust doctrine.' 2 ' The possible
adverse consequences of massive coal mining in southwestern North Da-
kota alarmed the plaintiffs in United Plainsmen.122 They sought to en-
join the State Water Conservation Commission from issuing permits to
115. 90 Cal. App. 3d 590, 153 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1979).
116. Id. at 599, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 524.
117. Id.
118. See also California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 90 Cal. App. 3d 816,
153 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1979). Fullerton and California Trout are discussed in Tarlock, Recognition of
Instream Flow Rights: "New" Public Western Water Rights, 25 ROCKY MT. M.L. INST. 24-1, 24-25
to 24-26 (1979).
119. 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976).
120. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied sub nom. City of Los Angeles
Dep't of Water & Power v. National Audubon Soc'y, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
121. Dunning, supra note 53, at 17-32 to 17-33.
122. Note, The Public Trust Doctrine in North Dakota, 54 N.D.L. REV. 565, 584 (1978).
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appropriate water for coal-related power and energy production facilities
until the state formulated a comprehensive short-term and long-term
plan to conserve and develop the state's natural resources.' 23 The trial
court dismissed the claim and the plaintiffs appealed.
The plaintiffs contended that North Dakota's water resources policy
statute mandated water resources planning. t24 The North Dakota
Supreme Court determined, however, that the statute's planning provi-
sions were "horatory and precatory, but not mandatory.' 25 At the same
time, the court also concluded that the public trust doctrine circum-
scribed the Commission's water allocation authority. 26 The Commis-
sion acknowledged the existence of the public trust concept but
maintained that the public trust doctrine limited merely the alienation of
submerged lands. The court declared, however, that the trust obligation
extended to the waters themselves.'
27
The North Dakota Supreme Court based its conclusion on both
state constitutional and statutory authority. First, it noted that a provi-
sion of the state constitution stated that "all flowing streams and natural
water courses shall forever remain the property of the state for mining,
irrigating and manufacturing purposes." '2 8 The court further observed
that a state statute classified various forms of water, including surface
water, as "public waters" and declared that they belonged to the pub-
lic.129 According to the court, these provisions could apply the trust con-
cept to flowing waters. 1
30
The court then considered the impact of the trust obligation on the
resource allocation decisions of state agencies. Observing that the Com-
mission had the statutory power to deny water permit applications that
were contrary to the public interest,' 3 ' the court declared that proper
resource allocation decisions must take public trust interests into ac-
count. In the court's opinion, this requirement forced the Commission to
engage in a planning process:
In the performance of this duty of resource allocation consistent
with the public interest, the Public Trust Doctrine requires, at a
minimum a determination of the potential effect of the allocation of
123. 247 N.W.2d 457, 459 (N.D. 1976).
124. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-26 (Supp. 1983). Subsection 4 of this statute provided that
"[a]ccruing benefits from these resources can best be achieved for the people of the state through
development, execution and periodic updating of comprehensive, coordinated and well-balanced
short-term and long-term plans and programs for the conservation and development of such re-
sources by the departments and agencies of the state having responsibilities therefor." Id. § 61-01-
26(4).
125. 247 N.W.2d 457, 460 (N.D. 1976) (quoting from Dathe v. Wildrose School Dist. No. 91,
217 N.W.2d 781, 782 (N.D. 1974)).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 461.
128. N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
129. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01 (1960).
130. 247 N.W.2d 457, 462 (N.D. 1976).
131. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-07.
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water on the present water supply and future water needs of this
State. This necessarily involves planning responsibility. The devel-
opment and implementation of some short- and long-term planning
capability is essential to effective allocation of resources "without
detriment to the public interest in the lands and waters
remaining."'
132
Accordingly, the court reversed the lower court's plenary dismissal and
remanded the case for trial.'
3 3
2. The National Audubon Decision
In National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County,
134
the California Supreme Court held that the public trust doctrine imposes
a duty of continuing supervision over the taking and use of appropriated
water. The case involved diversions by the City of Los Angeles from
nonnavigable streams that emptied into Mono Lake.
Mono Lake is located 340 miles northeast of Los Angeles, at the
foot of the eastern slope of the Sierra Nevada Mountains and near the
entrance to Yosemite National Park. 135 About thirteen miles long and
eight miles wide,136 the lake is the second largest lake in California. 37
The water in the lake is three times as saline as seawater; 138 conse-
quently, it contains no fish but supports a large population of brine
shrimp and brine flies, which feed vast numbers of nesting and migratory
birds. 139 Islands in the lake protect a large breeding colony of California
gulls, " and the lake itself serves as a haven on the migration route for
thousands of Northern Phalarope, Wilson's Phalarope, and Eared
Greve. '4' The lake is also a popular recreation area for tourists and sup-
ports a small brine shrimp industry.'42
Five freshwater streams carry water from snowmelt in the Sierra
Nevada mountains and flow into the west shore of the lake. 14 3 In 1940,
the state water resources agency granted to the Los Angeles Department
of Water and Power a permit to appropriate almost the entire flow of
132. 247 N.W.2d 457, 462 (N.D. 1976).
133. Id. at 464.
134. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
135. Note, supra note 5, at 619.
136. Johnson, supra note 7, at 236, n.13.
137. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 424, 658 P.2d 709, 711, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 348, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977
(1983).
138. Johnson, supra note 7, at 236, n.13.
139. Comment, 5 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 121, 122 (1983).
140. The lake served as a nesting area for about 95% of the state's gull population. Smith, The
Public Trust Doctrine and National Audubon Society v. Superior Court: A Hard Case Makes Bad
Law or the Consistent Evolution of California Water Rights, 6 GLENDALE L. REV. 201, 210 (1984).
141. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 424, 658 P.2d 709, 711, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 348, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977
(1983). See also CALIFORNIA DEPT. OF WATER RESOURCES, REPORT OF INTERAGENCY TASK
FORCE ON MONO LAKE 21 (1979) [hereinafter WATER RESOURCES REPORT].
142. Note, Expanding, supra note 5, at 619.
143. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 424, 658 P.2d 709, 711, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 348, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977
(1983).
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four of these streams."4 The next year the city constructed a diversion
tunnel from the Mono Basin to its existing aqueduct system and began to
divert about half of the flow from these tributary streams.14
In 1970 Los Angeles completed a second aqueduct which allowed it
to increase its withdrawals to almost 100,000 acre-feet per year. 146 These
diversions made up about twenty percent of the city's annual water sup-
ply; 147 however, the effect on the ecology of Mono Lake was devastating.
The level of Lake Mono has dropped forty-six feet since the diversions
first began in 1941.148 Furthermore, the volume of the lake has declined
by one-half and its surface area has been reduced by one-third.,49 The
city's diversion of fresh water from the lake also caused the salinity of the
lake to increase. "0 This increase in salinity affected the lake's algae upon
which the brine shrimp feed, causing a sharp reduction in the brine
shrimp population.' Because many species of birds feed on the lake's
brine shrimp, the reduction in the lake's shrimp population endangered a
major avian food source.152 The drop in the water level exposed one of
the lake's island gull nesting sites to easy access by coyotes and other
predators. 153  In addition, the lake's lower level exposed more than
18,000 acres of alkaline lake bottom. The lake bed is composed of very
fine silt, which easily becomes airborne in the wind when dry. This silt
contains a high concentration of alkali and other minerals that irritate
the mucous membranes and respiratory systems of humans and ani-
mals. ' 4 Finally, the lower lake level diminished its recreational value. '
In 1979, the Audubon Society and others brought suit against the
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, arguing that the Depart-
ment's continuing diversions of Mono Lake's tributary streams violated
the public's rights under the public trust doctrine.' 6 The Department
144. Id.; Note, Expanding, supra note 5, at 619.
145. Note, supra note 12, at 357, n.3.
146. Smith, supra note 140, at 210. Before 1970 the city diverted about 57,000 acre-feet per
year from the Mono Basin. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 428, 658 P.2d 709, 714, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 351, cerL
denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
147. Dunning, supra note 53, at 17-27. The city also generated more than 300 million kilowatt
hours of electricity from the diverted water. Id.
148. Comment, 24 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 219, 220 (1984).
149. Comment, supra note 44, at 809. If Los Angeles continues to withdraw water from the
Mono Lake basin at the same rate, the lake's surface area may eventually decrease by 36.7 square
miles and the water level will drop 86 feet from the prediversion level. Smith, supra note 140, at 210.
150. The salinity of the lake increased from 48,000 parts per million in 1941 to 98,000 parts per
million in 1981. Dunning, supra note 53, at 17-27 to 17-28.
151. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 430, 658 P.2d 709, 715, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 352, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977
(1983); WATER RESOURCEs REPORT, supra note 141, at 20-21.
152. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 430, 658 P.2d 709, 715, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 352, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977
(1983). In addition, the higher salinity level requires the birds to drink more fresh water in order to
maintain osmotic equilibrium. Id.
153. Note, Expanding, supra note 5, at 620.
154. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 431, 658 P.2d 709, 716, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 353, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977
(1983).
155. Comment, supra note 44, at 810.
156. Plaintiffs filed the suit in Mono County, but the court transferred it to Alpine County. 33
Cal. 3d 419, 431, 658 P.2d 709, 716, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 353, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
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subsequently cross-complained against other water users in the Mono
Basin, including the federal government.' 57 The United States removed
the case to the federal district court in Sacramento. The federal court
invoked the abstention doctrine, however, and stayed the federal pro-
ceedings to allow the California courts to decide whether the prior ap-
propriation doctrine subsumed the public trust doctrine and whether the
Audubon Society had to exhaust its administrative remedies before seek-
ing judicial relief..15
In response to this action, the plaintiffs filed a new complaint for
declaratory relief in the Alpine County Superior Court. The court en-
tered a summary judgment against the plaintiffs, ruling that the public
trust doctrine did not function independently of the prior appropriation
system. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs must exhaust their
administrative remedies before the Board before litigating. 5 9 The plain-
tiffs then successfully petitioned the California Supreme Court to review
the lower court's decision.'6°
The California Supreme Court in National Audubon analyzed three
aspects of the public trust doctrine: (1) the purpose of the trust; (2) the
scope of the trust; and (3) the state's obligation to protect trust re-
sources. 16 1 Relying on Marks v. Whitney, 62 the court declared that the
public trust was not limited to protecting navigation, commerce, and
fisheries; the public trust also included recreational and ecological pur-
poses such as the scenic view of the lake and its shore, the purity of the
air, and the use of the lake by the birds for nesting and feeding
purposes. 1
63
The court also declared that the scope of the public trust doctrine
was not limited to tidal waters. Rather, the doctrine extended to naviga-
ble fresh waters and, in some cases, to nonnavigable tributaries as well.
Although Mono Lake was a navigable watercourse, the tributary streams
that emptied into it were not.164 Drawing on two early California cases
which addressed this issue,1 65 the court concluded that the public trust
doctrine applied to upstream diversions which impaired instream values
157. The Department contended that if its water rights were subject to the public trust, then the
rights of other water users in the Basin were similarly burdened. In effect, the Department sought a
basin-wide adjudication of water rights. Dunning, supra note 53, at 17-28.
158. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 431-32, 658 P.2d 709, 717, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 353-54, cert. denied, 464
U.S. 977 (1983).
159. Id. at 433, 658 P.2d at 718, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
160. Id.
161. Note, Expanding, supra note 5, at 631.
162. 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
163. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 434-35, 658 P.2d 709, 719, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 356, cert. denied, 464 U.S.
977 (1983). The court added, however, that "[miost decisions and commentators assume that 'trust
issues' relate to uses and activities in the vicinity of the lake, stream, or tidal reach at issue." Id. at
440, 658 P.2d at 723, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
164. Id. at 435, 658 P.2d at 720, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 356-57.
165. People v. Russ, 132 Cal. 102, 64 P. Ill (1901); People v. Gold Run D. & M. Co., 66 Cal.
138, 4 P. 1152 (1884).
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in a downstream navigable watercourse.
166
In addition, the court considered the authority and duties of the
state as trustee of trust resources. It began by observing that the state,
except in rare instances, could not completely abandon its control over
trust resources. Parties who acquired rights in trust property held these
rights subject to the trust and, therefore, could assert no vested right to
use those rights in a manner harmful to the trust. According to the
court, these principles applied to rights in flowing waters just as they did
to other trust property. 1
67
The court confirmed that the Water Resources Board had the statu-
tory authority to take public trust interests into account when it granted
new water rights.' 68 It also rejected the argument that the law of prior
appropriation had subsumed the public trust doctrine, thereby preclud-
ing separate consideration of trust interests by the Board in permit appli-
cation proceedings. 69  Because the Board had admittedly not taken
public trust values into account when it granted an appropriative right to
Los Angeles in 1940,170 the court concluded that the Board could recon-
sider the propriety of the 1940 permit.'
7'
The court also declared, however, that the public trust imposes a
duty of continuing supervision over the taking and use of appropriated
water. Consequently, the state had the power to reconsider past alloca-
tion decisions even though an agency had made those decisions after due
consideration of their effect on the public trust.'72 This conclusion re-
flected the view that water users could not acquire a vested property
right in the water itself;173 they merely obtained a usufructuary right to
the water. '
74
Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that it could not treat flowing
waters in the same manner as tidelands or submerged lands. 75 It admit-
ted that the prosperity and habitability of much of California required
the diversion of great quantities of water from its streams for purposes
166. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 437, 658 P.2d 709, 721, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 357, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977
(1983). The court did not decide whether the public trust doctrine can protect environmental or
recreational values in nonnavigable waters. Id. at 437, n. 19, 658 P.2d at 721, n. 19, 189 Cal. Rptr. at
357-58. But see Walston, supra note 10, at 85; Note, Expanding, supra note 5, at 638-40.
167. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 445, 658 P.2d 709, 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 364, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977
(1983).
168. Id. at 444, 658 P.2d at 725-26, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 363, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). See
also Johnson, supra note 7, at 257-58 (arguing that the public trust doctrine should limit the state's
power to grant water permits which impair navigability and other public rights).
169. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 445, 658 P.2d 709, 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 364, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977
(1983).
170. Id. at 447, 658 P.2d at 728-29, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
171. Id. at 447-48, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365-66.
172. Id. See also Comment, supra note 44, at 824.
173. See CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 1971).
174. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 441, 658 P.2d 709, 724, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 361, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977
(1983) (citing Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal. 2d 501, 554-55, 81 P.2d 533, 534 (1938)).
175. Id. at 446, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364-65. See also Dunning, supra note 53, at
17-32.
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unconnected to any navigation, recreation, or ecological use relating to
the source stream.'76 Consequently, the court conceded that as a matter
of practical necessity the state may have to approve appropriations de-
spite foreseeable harm to public trust uses.'77
Finally, the court concluded that the plaintiff need not exhaust its
administrative remedies before filing suit against the city.' In the
court's opinion, both the Water Board and the courts had concurrent
jurisdiction over water rights disputes of this nature. 7 9 Consequently,
the National Audubon Society could bring suit to determine the extent to
which the public trust doctrine limited the city's water rights in the
Mono Lake basin.
However, the court in National Audubon did not dictate a particular
allocative result.' 8 ° Therefore, when the Water Resources Board reviews
the city's water rights at some future time, it may consider both the im-
portance of protecting public trust values in Mono Lake and the water
needs of the residents of Los Angeles.' The Board could confirm the
city's right to divert water from the Mono Basin; it could determine that
the damage to the lake's ecology outweighed the city's water supply
needs and revoke the city's water withdrawal permit; or the agency could
reduce the amount of water it allows the city to divert.' 82
B. Evaluation of United Plainsmen and National Audubon
The impact of the United Plainsmen decision is difficult to assess.
The case may have simply affirmed the state's power to deny water per-
mit applications that are not in the public interest. By introducing the
public trust doctrine into its analysis, however, the United Plainsmen
court imposed an affirmative obligation on state agencies to consider al-
ternative uses, including instream uses, before granting appropriation
permits.8 3 On the other hand, the court did not hold that the public
trust principle restricted the exercise of existing appropriative water
rights, nor did it suggest that the Commission should give trust purposes
any particular weight in its planning process. Thus, although the agency
must take trust purposes into account, it could apparently place a higher
value on consumptive uses.
The California Supreme Court's decision in National Audubon is
176. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 446, 658 P.2d 709, 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 364, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977
(1983).
177. Id. at 446, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364-65.
178. Id. at 449-51, 658 P.2d at 731-32, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 366-68. See also Comment, supra note
148, at 224-25.
179. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 451, 658 P.2d 709, 732, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 367-68, cert. denied, 464 U.S.
977 (1983). See also Comment, 61 U. DET. J. URB. L. 321, 329-31 (1984).
180. Note, Expanding, supra note 5, at 636.
181. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 447, 658 P.2d 709, 728-29, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 365, cert. denied, 464 U.S.
977 (1983).
182. Note, Expanding, supra note 5, at 636.
183. Tarlock, supra note 6, at 240; Dunning, supra note 53, at 17-34 to 17-35.
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more significant. By engrafting the public trust concept onto the prior
appropriation system, the court has provided environmentalists with a
new tool to protect aesthetic, recreational, and ecological values. This
additional protection comes, however, at a very high cost. Over the
years, economists and legal scholars have emphasized that water rights
must be secure to achieve optimal use of water resources.'" 4 According
to these commentators, the prior appropriation system is superior to
riparianism and eastern water permit systems because it gives water users
greater security. Arguably, by giving the state Water Conservation
Board the power to modify existing water permits, the court in National
Audubon impaired this security. Can other techniques better protect
these public interests without undermining the security of water rights
under the prior appropriation doctrine? This article shall examine some
other approaches.
V. STATE EFFORTS TO PROTECT INSTREAM USES
Both the federal government' 85 and the states 86 have initiated new
measures to protect instream values. In the East as well as in the West, a
large number of states have modified their existing water allocation sys-
tems to support instream uses. In addition, many states have established
protected rivers programs. Finally, some states have expanded their defi-
nitions of navigability.
A. Modification of Traditional Water Allocation Doctrines
1. Modification of the Riparian System
More than a dozen eastern states now have enacted legislation to
modify common law ground water and surface water allocation doc-
trines. 18 7 Some of these statutes have created comprehensive regulatory
systems; other statutes are much more limited in scope. 188 Nevertheless,
these statutes have certain common features. For example, water users
who are subject to regulation must obtain permits before they can with-
184. See generally Trelease, The Model Water Code, The Wise Administrator and the Goddam
Bureaucrat, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 207 (1974); Ciriacy-Wantrup, Concepts Used as Economic Crite-
ria for a System of Water Rights, 32 LAND ECON. 295 (1956).
185. E.g., Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791(a)-823a (1982); Endangered Species Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982); Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1982). These
statutes are discussed in Hayes & Watson, Stream Flow Maintenance in Virginia, 18 U. RICH. L.
REV. 485, 493-511 (1984).
186. U.S. Dept. of Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, State Laws and Instream Flows (1977).
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has also published a series of monographs on individual state
instream flow management programs. The "strategies" series includes Arizona, California, Colo-
rado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Wash-
ington, and Wyoming. The "opportunities" series covers Arkansas, Georgia, Iowa, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
187. Ausness, supra note 84, at 556-76.
188. Florida, Iowa, and New Jersey have the most comprehensive regulatory programs. See
FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 373 (West 1974); IOWA CODE §§ 455B.261 to 455B.281 (West Supp. 1985);
N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 58 (1982).
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draw or divert water. Like those in prior appropriation states, these per-
mits are usually specific in terms of time, place, manner, and amount of
withdrawal. In addition, subsequent applicants typically must demon-
strate that their requested withdrawals will not harm existing water
users.18 9 Furthermore, water use permits are not perpetual; they usually
expire after a limited time.190
This type of statutory permit system potentially may protect in-
stream uses better than the riparian system alone. Under the statutory
allocation schemes, water use decisions do not rest solely on economic
interest as they do under common law water rights doctrines. Instead,
an administrative agency regulates water users; this agency is empowered
and required to take the public interest into consideration when it makes
water allocation decisions. Some states explicitly tie water allocation de-
cisions by the agency to a comprehensive water plan which also reflects
environmental and recreational values.1 91 Finally, because owners must
periodically renew water permits, the administrative agency can reallo-
cate water according to changing needs and circumstances. 92
2. Modification of the Prior Appropriation System
Historically, instream uses have received less recognition under the
prior appropriation doctrine than under the riparian system. Some west-
ern states have changed their traditional water allocation regime, how-
ever, to protect instream uses. In particular, these states have approved
instream appropriations and have recognized instream values when ap-
plying the "public interest" standard in appropriation permit
proceedings.
a. Instream Appropriations
A number of western states now expressly authorize instream appro-
priations. For example, state agencies can now make instream appropri-
ations to preserve the natural environment in several western states.
193
In some cases private persons can also make such appropriations.' 94
Instream appropriations are useful as a means to protect environ-
mental values in flowing streams. The holder of an instream appropria-
tion right can contest the issuance of a subsequent permit on the stream
189. Ausness, supra note 84, at 554-56.
190. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.236(1) (West 1974) (20 years); GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-
31(h) (1986 Cum. Supp.) (10 to 20 years); IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.265 (West Supp. 1985) (10
years).
191. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.036(7)-(9) (West Supp. 1985).
192. Reallocation options and the problem of compensating water users whose permits lapse are
discussed in Ausness, supra note 84, at 584-87.
193. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-102(3) (1974); IDAHO CODE § 67-4307 (1980).
194. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-141 (Supp. 1984-85). See Note, supra note 94, at 1103.
Most commentators believe, however, that this power should be restricted to public agencies.
Tarlock, supra note 118, at 24-3 to 24-4; Note, supra note 104, at 149; Comment, supra note 4, at
416.
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if it conflicts with the instream appropriation. 95 Even when users over-
appropriate streams, senior appropriators may be located at downstream
points. Consequently, many streams may have good flows through a
large portion of the stream's reach; instream appropriations can protect
these flows against new water users.196 Moreover, the instream appropri-
ation concept does not impair existing water rights. First, a new user
who desires to make an instream appropriation must show that the
amount of water claimed is actually necessary to maintain the riparian
habitat it seeks to preserve. 197 Secondly, instream appropriations are al-
ways subordinate to the rights of existing water users.' 98
The validity of instream appropriation statutes has been challenged,
however, in several states; so far these attacks have been unsuccessful. In
one case, the Idaho Department of Parks sought to appropriate water for
environmental purposes in the Malad Canyon area of the state.' 99 The
Department of Water Administration denied the permit after finding that
the Department of Parks would not make a physical diversion. Finding
that a user could make a valid appropriation under the Idaho statute
without a physical diversion, the trial court reversed the agency's deci-
sion and ordered it to issue the permit.
Intervening water users' associations contended that instream ap-
propriations were inconsistent with the constitutional right to appropri-
ate because they represented "an insidious scheme in an attempt to
monopolize the state's unappropriated waters or to condemn already ap-
propriated waters."' The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed, however,
with this contention because the appropriated water would be available
for appropriation by downstream users. The court also rejected the argu-
ment that the statute infringed upon the constitutional right to appropri-
ate, holding that the constitution did not require a physical diversion in
order to appropriate water.2 '
A court upheld Colorado's instream appropriation statute against a
similar attack in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Colorado
Water Conservation Board.2 °2 The Water District, which sought to di-
vert water from the Crystal River and one of its tributaries, claimed that
a prior instream appropriation made under the state statute was invalid.
The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the right-to-divert argument, rea-
soning that the constitutional right to appropriate2 "3 did not prohibit in-
195. Comment, supra note 4, at 417.
196. Note, supra note 104, at 151.
197. Note, supra note 94, at 1106. Further protection for existing and potential water users
would result by limiting instream appropriations to public agencies. Tarlock, supra note 118, at 24-
4; Comment, supra note 4, at 416.
198. Note, supra note 104, at 150-51.
199. Idaho Dep't of Parks v. Idaho Dep't of Water Admin., 96 Idaho 440, 530 P.2d 924 (1974).
200. 530 P.2d at 927.
201. 530 P.2d at 928.
202. 594 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1979).
203. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
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stream appropriations because it was solely concerned with abolishing
riparian rights.2°
b. "Public Interest" Restriction on Water Permit Applications
Many western states authorize their water resources agencies to
deny or condition water use applications in order to promote the "public
interest. ' 2°5 Historically, these states have narrowly defined "public in-
terest" in terms of economic efficiency and have not explicitly included
environmental values. 2 6 The public interest concept is now expanding,
however, and many states have added environmental values to the list of
criteria used to evaluate new applications to appropriate water.20 7
In addition, some states have adopted environmental policy acts
which impose an affirmative obligation on state agencies to consider the
ecology when ruling on applications to appropriate water.208 In Stempel
v. Department of Water Resources,2" for example, littoral owners who
contended that lowering the lake level would cause pollution challenged
an application to appropriate water from a small lake. A state statute
directed the state water resources agency to determine whether any pro-
posed appropriation would be a "detriment to the public welfare."2 '
The agency ruled that this language did not require it to consider envi-
ronmental factors. The Washington Supreme Court disagreed, holding
that the agency must consider the pollution issue. The court also ruled
that the state environmental policy act2 1 required the water resources
agency to prepare an environmental impact statement as part of its per-
mit application process.
B. Withdrawal, Reservation, and Preservation Flow Programs
States can also temporarily or permanently withdraw water at cer-
tain points on a stream from appropriation.21 2 For example, Oregon has
withdrawn the waters of some streams and lakes from further appropria-
tion for some or all uses.21 3 Other states have imposed temporary mora-
toria on new appropriations in order to give state agencies time to
formulate policy. 2 4 The Montana legislature has imposed a moratorium
on future appropriations in the Yellowstone Basin, for example, in order
204. 594 P.2d 570, 573 (Colo. 1979).
205. Note, supra note 104, at 146; Lamb, Prediciting the Results of Instream Flow Policies, in
WATER FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: WILL IT BE THERE? 840, 841 (M. Collins ed. 1984).
206. Tarlock, supra note 3, at 888.
207. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 1253 (West 1971); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-8 (1980).
208. Comment, supra note 4, at 409.
209. 82 Wash. 2d 109, 508 P.2d 166 (1973).
210. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.03.290 (1985).
211. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.21C.010-.910 (1983).
212. Note, Appropriation by the State of Minimum Flows in New Mexico Streams, 15 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 809, 810 (1975).
213. OR. REV. STAT. § 538.110-.300 (1985); Comment, supra note 4, at 392.
214. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.142 (West 1974) (repealed 1972); UTAH CODE § 73-6-1
(1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.54.050(2) (1983).
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to determine whether the Basin needs permanent reservations for in-
stream uses.215
The practice of reserving water for instream purposes is similar to
withdrawal. Montana has a procedure for reserving water for certain
public purposes, including the preservation of instream flows. 2 16 Under
Alaska's instream reservation program, any persons, corporation, or gov-
ernment agency may apply to the Department of Natural Resources to
reserve water for instream purposes.217
Other states have fixed minimum or preservation flows for their
streams and have prohibited withdrawals or impoundments which inter-
fere with established flow levels.21 The process of establishing preserva-
tion flow standards requires both scientific study and determination of
appropriate goals of public officials. The scientific or technological as-
pect involves measuring various hydraulic and hydrological components
of streamflow to determine the hydraulic conditions on the stream that
must be maintained in order to meet a given objective. 219 States are in-
creasingly using species preservation as a surrogate for other instream
uses. Therefore, preservation standards usually require the maintenance
of streamflows that are sufficient to sustain fish, aquatic insects, and ripa-
rian vegetation;220 however, some states explicitly consider recreational
or aesthetic interests. For example, the Washington statute directs the
state to establish "base flows" necessary to preserve fish, wildlife, scenic,
aesthetic, and other environmental values in perennial rivers and
streams.2 21
Although preservation flow programs are one of the most promising
methods of protecting instream uses, commentators have made valid crit-
icism about their utility. First, methodologies for establishing preserva-
tion flows are still in the formative stage and require further study.2 22
Second, the decision to base resource allocation solely on fish and wildlife
proxies is questionable because these criteria are not necessarily relevant
215. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-601 to 608 (1983). Since this moratorium, a number of users
have filed reservations, including one for 8.2 million acre-feet by the Fish and Game Commission.
Tarlock, supra note 6, at 241-42. See also COOPERATIVE INSTREAM FLOW SERVICE GROUP, PRO-
TECTING FLOWS IN MONTANA: YELLOWSTONE RIVER RESERVATION CASE STUDY (Instream
Flow Information Paper No. 10, Sept. 1980).
216. MONT. REV. CODE § 85-2-316 (1983). See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-31 (Supp.
1983); S.D. CODE § 46-5-38 (1983 & Supp. 1984).
217. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.145 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
218. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 26-141b (West Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 373.042 (West 1974); IDAHO CODE § 42-1736A (Cum. Supp. 1986) (repealed 1985); MIss. CODE
ANN. § 51-3-7 (Cum. Supp. 1985); VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-106 (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 31.02
(1973). See also 7 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 615 (R. Clark ed. 1976).
219. See generally METHODOLOGIES FOR THE DETERMINATION OF STREAM RESOURCE FLOW
REQUIREMENTS: AN ASSESSMENT (C. Stalnaker & J. Arnette eds. 1976).
220. Tarlock, supra note 6, at 218.
221. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.54.020(3)(a) (1983).
222. See Stalnaker & Arnette, Methodologies for Determining Instream Flows for Fish and Other
Aquatic Life, in METHODOLOGIES FOR THE DETERMINATION OF STREAM RESOURCE FLOW RE-
QUIREMENTS: AN ASSESSMENT (C. Stalnaker & J. Arnette eds. 1976).
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to protect other instream interests.223 Nevertheless, the preservation
flow concept is potentially the most effective state response to the needs
of instream users.
C. Protected Rivers Programs
Many states have enacted statutes to restrict diversions along desig-
nated wild and scenic rivers and thus preserve their natural water
levels.224 Most of these statutes follow the federal Wild and Scenic Riv-
ers Act of 1968.225 In addition, other states regulate the construction
and operation of dams on certain rivers in order to protect instream
values.226
D. Expansion of the Navigability Concept
Some states have expanded their traditional definition of navigabil-
ity in order to protect streamflows. The concept of navigability serves a
variety of functions and the definition of "navigability" varies accord-
ingly. For example, states use navigability to determine state ownership
of sovereignty lands; 227 the concept also provides a measure of the federal
government's regulatory authority under the commerce clause.228 In ad-
dition, navigability provides a basis for state regulatory power and de-
fines the scope of public rights in lakes and streams. In the -past most
states applied a "navigability in fact" test to determine whether the mem-
bers of the public could gain access to a watercourse. This approach
considers a watercourse navigable when members of the public use it, or
can use it, in its ordinary condition, as a highway of commerce over
which they can conduct trade and travel in the customary fashion.229
Some courts have rejected commercial use as the sole test of naviga-
bility; instead they have adopted a recreational or "public use" stan-
dard.230  The rationale for this broader definition is that states
223. Tarlock, supra note 6, at 218-20.
224. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 5093.50-.65 (West 1984); KY. REV. STAT. §§ 146.200
to .360 (1984); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 390.805-.925 (1981); S.D. CODE §§ 46A-1-15 to -16 (1983);
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 79.72.010 to .900 (1983).
225. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1271-87 (West 1985). See also Tarlock & Tippy, The Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act of 1968, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 707 (1970).
226. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 401-406 (West Supp. 1985).
227. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49
(1926). See generally Johnson & Austin, Recreational Rights and Titles to Beds on Western Lakes
and Streams, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1967).
228. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940); United States v. Rio
Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
See also Leighty, The Source and Scope of Public and Private Rights in Navigable Waters, 5 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 391, 398-401 (1970).
229. Johnson & Austin, supra note 227, at 1.
230. See. e.g., State v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d 659 (Ark. 1980); People v. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3d
1040, 1050, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448, 454 (1971); Southern Idaho Fish & Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock,
Inc., 96 Idaho 360, 528 P.2d 1295 (1974); contra People v. Emmert, 198 Colo. 137, 597 P.2d 1025
(1979); Attorney General v. Woods, 108 Mass. 436, 439-40 (1871); Kelly ex rel MacMullan v.
Hallden, 51 Mich. App. 176, 214 N.W.2d 856 (1974); Lamprey v. Metcalf, 52 Minn. 181, 53 N.W.
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formulated the commercial use test before recreational uses existed and,
therefore, failed to take them into account. According to these courts, a
recreationally-based definition of navigability is necessary to protect
what has become a significant economic activity.23'
When this broader definition classifies a watercourse as navigable, it
imposes an easement of passage against the owner of the streambed and
gives the public access to the overlying waters for navigation, fishing, and
other recreational purposes.232 For example, a Michigan appellate court
in Kelly ex rel. MacMullen v. Hallden 233 held that the public enjoyed
recreational boating and fishing rights on the St. Joseph River. This
holding applied regardless of whether Michigan's "saw log" test re-
garded the river as navigable.234 In People ex rel. Baker v. Mack,235 the
state of California brought a public nuisance action against landowners
on the Fall River who were attempting to prevent members of the public
from boating, fishing, and hunting on portions of the river adjacent to
their property. The defendant landowners claimed that the river was not
navigable under the traditional commercial purpose test. The court re-
jected the notion that it should determine public recreational rights by
such a narrow standard, however, and held the river to be navigable and,
therefore, accessible to the public.236
Commentators have suggested that these "public use" cases are re-
ally manifestations of the public trust doctrine. Although courts seldom
invoke the public trust principle expressly, the rationale behind these
cases-free access to waters that users can put to beneficial public use-is
similar to the theory that underlies the public trust doctrine.237 This sim-
ilarity does not mean that adopting a public use definition of navigability
obviates the need for statutory protection of instream uses. Preservation
flow programs, however, in conjunction with the public use test, may
effectively respond to instream use problems. Thus, preservation flow
1139 (1893); Coleman v. Schaeffer, 126 N.E.2d 444 (Ohio 1955); Luscher v. Reynolds, 153 Or. 625,
631, 56 P.2d 1158, 1162 (1936). See also Abrams, supra note 14, at 169-71; Stone, Legal Back-
ground on Recreational Use of Montana Waters, 32 MONT. L. REV. 1, 6-10 (1971); Comment, Public
Recreation on Nonnavigable Lakes and the Doctrine of Reasonable Use, 55 IOWA L. REV. 1064
(1970); Note, Property-Susceptibility of Beds of Navigable Waters to Private Ownership, 50 TUL. L.
REV. 193 (1975).
231. See, e.g., State v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d 659, 664-65 (Ark. 1980); State ex rel. Brown v.
Newport Concrete Co., 44 Ohio App. 2d 121, 336 N.E.2d 453, 457 (1975).
232. Sherton, supra note 194, at 411.
233. 51 Mich. App. 176, 214 N.W.2d 856 (1974).
234. Some states, particularly in the Mid-West and West, adopted a "saw log" test of navigabil-
ity. These states considered streams navigable if logs could float on them either continually or sea-
sonably. See, e.g., Moore v. Sanborne, 2 Mich. 520 (1853); Guilliams v. Beaver Lake Club, 90 Or.
13, 175 P. 437 (1918); Watkins v. Dorris, 24 Wash. 636, 64 P. 840 (1901); Nekoosa Edwards Paper
Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 201 Wis. 40, 42, 228 N.W. 144, 146 (1929), aff'd per curiam, 283 U.S. 787
(1931); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 36-1601. See also Tarlock, supra note 118, at 24-16 to 24-17.
235. 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1047, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448, 454 (1971).
236. See also People v. El Dorado County, 96 Cal. App. 3d 403, 157 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1980);
Hitchings v. Del Rio Woods Recreation & Parks Dist., 55 Cal. App. 3d 560, 127 Cal. Rptr. 830
(1976). These cases are discussed in Stevens, supra note 10, at 204-08.
237. Johnson, supra note 7, at 251-52.
[Vol. 1986
PROTECTION OF INSTREAM USES
programs can address ecological factors, while the public use test re-
sponds to the recreational needs of the public.
VI. CONCLUSION
At first blush, the theory of using the public trust doctrine to protect
instream uses is an appealing strategy. The trust concept reflects the uni-
versal feeling that certain resources are so critical that they must not
entirely leave public control.238 Virtually everyone would agree that
water is such a resource. In fact, fresh water resources are probably
more important to the public welfare than tidelands, the traditional focus
of the public trust doctrine. Accordingly, it can be argued that the public
trust protection should be extended from tideland areas and submerged
lands to flowing waters to further the trust doctrine's underlying
rationale.
Proponents of the public trust doctrine approach point out two as-
pects of the doctrine that enhance its utility as a resource management
tool. First, the public trust concept is flexible and can adapt to changing
social priorities.239 Second, it regards the public, not the government, as
the beneficial owner of trust resources. Consequently, courts can enforce
the public trust doctrine against the government itself.24  Standing re-
quirements are generally not very restrictive, 24' and courts seem willing
to engage in a searching inquiry when called upon to determine whether
a particular legislative or administrative action is consistent with public
trust obligations.242 This inquiry may lead to outright reversal of a legis-
lative or administrative decision;243 more often the court requires that
the legislature or agency reevaluate its decision, either in a more broad-
based forum or by a process that properly considers trust interests. 2 4
Nevertheless, the public trust doctrine is no panacea. Although it
allows for some judicial oversight of legislative or administrative resource
allocation decisions, the public trust doctrine does not establish any par-
ticular set of priorities.245 Environmental concerns will not necessarily
prevail when the state must choose between conflicting uses of a re-
source. Furthermore, some restraint is necessary if the public trust doc-
trine is to extend into the consumptive water rights area. Prospective
238. Note, Water Allocation, supra note 5, at 698-99.
239. Johnson, supra note 7, at 234.
240. Berland, Toward the True Meaning of the Public Trust, I SEA GRANT L.J. 83, 120-21
(1976).
241. See generally Note, supra note 16, at 234-43.
242. See generally Sax, supra note 9, at 557-65.
243. See, e.g., Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966);
Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972); Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land
& Improvement Co., 93 Wis. 534, 67 N.W. 918 (1896).
244. See, e.g., National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658
P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North
Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976); Muench v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952).
245. Stevens, supra note 10, at 223.
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macro-level water allocation decisions which apply the public trust doc-
trine, as in United Plainsmen, are not particularly worrisome. State deci-
sionmakers should consider instream uses and other ecological needs
when they make significant allocative decisions. If statutes do not re-
quire decisionmakers to take these interests into account, the public trust
doctrine can remedy this deficiency.
On the other hand, the public trust doctrine does not serve any ap-
parent purpose when applied to individual permit applications and other
micro-level decisions by state water allocation agencies. In the West, the
"public interest" concept arguably fulfills the same function as the public
trust principle. Similarly, water allocation statutes in the East typically
allow administrators to deny water permit applications that are contrary
to the public interest. When necessary, legislatures in western or eastern
states can modify permit application procedures to explicitly require that
the agency consider environmental or recreational factors.
A system that applies the public trust doctrine to decisions which
create new water rights does no harm and may be beneficial. A system,
however, that introduces the trust concept to reevaluate existing water
rights is an entirely different matter. The California court's approach in
National Audubon is inconsistent with a system of stable and secure
water rights. Use of the public trust doctrine in this manner is a poten-
tial threat to water users, especially in the West where states have tradi-
tionally given water rights more protection than in the East.246 The
public trust concept cuts across the priority principle which has hereto-
fore been the cornerstone of the prior appropriation system. 4 7 Thus,
senior appropriators, who formerly enjoyed a high degree of security,
now face the prospect of having their "vested" water rights modified or
even terminated at some future time by a court or administrative agency.
Courts and agencies undoubtedly will not completely extinguish
presently exercised appropriative rights very often. As the California
court acknowledged in National Audubon, when the economy of the
state depends upon water, the state will frequently have to sacrifice envi-
ronmental values.248 Nevertheless, the mere possibility that a state might
terminate existing water rights may discourage future investment in
water-dependent activities. In fact, large-scale activities may have a
greater impact on trust values and, therefore, be a more likely target for
recurring judicial or administrative scrutiny.
A system that limits the role of the public trust doctrine in the water
rights area does not necessarily fail to protect instream uses adequately.
The measures discussed in Part V offer a variety of promising alternatives
for states to protect instream uses from injury. Moreover, although these
246. Walston, supra note 10, at 91-92.
247. Dunning, supra note 7, at 383-84.
248. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 446, 658
P.2d 709, 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 364, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
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measures may restrict the water rights, they are not so disruptive to the
stability of the existing water allocation regime as use of the public trust
doctrine.
The public trust doctrine is based on the notion that private individ-
uals cannot fully own trust resources but can only hold them subject to a
servitude on behalf of the public. States can enlarge the scope of this
servitude without raising due process concerns because of the limited na-
ture of the owner's rights in the trust resource.249 Thus, water users do
not receive much legal protection against restrictions on their use of trust
resources under a public trust approach. On the other hand, users can
challenge state regulatory programs on substantive due process grounds
if these programs impair the value of the property rights excessively. For
this reason, restrictions imposed by state regulation are likely to be less
threatening to water users than those imposed under the auspices of the
public trust doctrine.
State systems should not superimpose the public trust doctrine upon
the existing water rights system in such a way as to impair the security of
existing water rights. States can accomplish this goal more efficiently
through statutory regulation. In particular, states can establish preserva-
tion flows and use a public interest formula in water permit application
proceedings to ensure that instream and other environmental values re-
ceive their proper weight.
249. Berland, supra note 240, at 135.
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